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Abstract
Our paper investigates the link between international outsourcing and wages utilising
a large household panel and combining it with industry level information on industries’
outsourcing activities from input-output tables. By doing so we can arguably overcome the
potential aggregation bias as well as other shortcomings that aﬀect industry level studies.
We ﬁnd that outsourcing has had a marked impact on wages. Distinguishing three skill
categories we ﬁnd evidence that outsourcing reduced the real wage for workers in the lowest
skill categories by up to 1.8% while it increased real wages for high-skilled workers by up to
3.3%. This result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
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1I Introduction
Outsourcing is a growing phenomenon in world trade and has sparked a lot of interest in
the recent academic literature and business press. As for the car industry, the Economist
(23 February 2002, p. 99) writes that: ”The whole industry is disintegrating (or becoming
less vertical) as vehicle assemblers try to outsource more and more of what they once did for
themselves.” There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that this is not limited to the car industry
but is also observed in other manufacturing and services sectors.1
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) provide evidence for the worldwide importance of out-
sourcing from data collected for 10 OECD and four emerging market countries. They ﬁnd
that trade in outsourced components in the vertical production chain accounts for around 21
percent of these countries’ exports. Moreover, international outsourcing grew very strongly
by approximately 30 percent between 1970 and 1990.2
Given that the increase in international outsourcing coincided with deteriorating rela-
tive wages and employment chances for low skilled workers in many developed countries
much research has been devoted to assess the impact of this disintegration of production
on domestic labour markets (see Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999 and Morrison-Paul and
Siegel (2001) for the US, Hijzen, G¨ org and Hine (2002) and Hijzen (2003) for the UK and
Geishecker (2002) for Germany).3 Most studies that investigate the impact of international
outsourcing do so by estimating the relative demand for skilled labour derived from a cost
function, or mandated wage regressions using aggregate industry or country level data. In
a sense this is quite unsatisfactory, as outsourcing has implications for micro units (ﬁrms or
workers) which should arguably be studied using micro level data in order to avoid aggrega-
tion bias. A notable exception in this literature is the recent work on Japanese micro level
data by Head and Ries (2002) which examines the impact of outsourcing on relative labour
demand. They ﬁnd that an expansion of employment in aﬃliates in low income countries
(which can be taken as a proxy of international outsourcing of low skill production) raises
the skill intensity of domestic production.4
1For example, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) provide examples from IT, car manufacturing, sport shoe manu-
facturing etc.
2See also Feenstra (1998) for a discussion of the growth of outsourcing or fragmentation of production.
3There have also been studies for other countries. See Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a concise review of this
literature. The papers on labour market eﬀects of outsourcing are of course related to the wider debate on the
eﬀects of trade and technology on wages, see Leamer (1998), Freeman (1995), Krugman (1995), Berman, Bound
and Machin (1998).
4Note, however, that they measure outsourcing in terms of oﬀshore employment rather than imported inter-
2Our paper investigates the link between outsourcing and wages from a diﬀerent perspec-
tive utilising a large household panel and combining it with industry level information on
industries’ outsourcing activities from input-output tables. Hence, we directly assess the
eﬀects of international outsourcing on wages at the level of the individual. By doing so we
can arguably overcome the potential aggregation bias as well as other shortcomings that may
aﬀect industry level studies. Furthermore, we extend the literature by employing three dif-
ferent deﬁnitions of workers’ skill levels. Usually, the literature just considers one deﬁnition;
the most common deﬁnition being based on production vs non-production workers, see, e.g.,
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Berman et al. (1998).
Our empirical analysis uses data from the large German Socio-Economic Household Panel,
which is described in some detail below, combined with industry level data for the period
1991 to 2000.5 The literature analysing the labour market impact of international trade in
a household panel framework is sparse and studies more speciﬁcally assessing the impact of
international fragmentation on the earnings distribution in the context of individual wage
models are, to the best of our knowledge, not existing. 6 Germany is an interesting case to
analyse, as there is a general consensus that relative wages of high vs. low skilled workers
have remained virtually unchanged since the 1980s, even though fragmentation of activities
has increased substantially during the 1990s, probably aided by the opening up of low wage
Eastern and Central European markets which provided potential for fragmentation.7
Against this background of nearly constant relative wages on aggregate, we ﬁnd from
our individual level data that international outsourcing has, nevertheless, had a marked
impact on wages. Distinguishing three skill categories we ﬁnd evidence that outsourcing
reduced the real wage for workers in the lowest skill categories; the results are similar in
terms of magnitude, if not statistical signiﬁcance, across the three deﬁnitions of skill groups.
Furthermore we ﬁnd evidence that high-skilled workers experienced increased wages due to
international outsourcing for all three skill deﬁnitions.
mediates, as in our paper and in most of the related literature.
5See Hunt (2001), Burda and Mertens (2001) and Krueger and Pischke (1995) for analyses using this data set
in diﬀerent contexts.
6Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999) estimate the impact of trade on real wages for diﬀerent skill groups
and various measures of labour market mobility combining data from the German Socio-Economic Household
Panel and industry level data for the period 1985-1991. Their results of a random eﬀects model indicate that
an increase in the trade deﬁcit ratio lowers real wages for low-skilled as well as for high-skilled workers by a
comparable amount. Hence, there is no indication of a skill bias in the wage impact of international trade.
7See the recent series of articles in the German business paper Handelsblatt under the heading ”Globalisierung,
neuester Stand” in the issue of 2 September 2003.
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews brieﬂy the theo-
retical and empirical literature on outsourcing, fragmentation and labour markets. Section
III highlights recent labour market trends and motivates our empirical study. Section IV
introduces the empirical model and discusses the data set. Section VI presents the empirical
ﬁndings and section VII concludes.
II International outsourcing and wages
The causes and consequences of outsourcing and fragmentation of production have attracted
considerable interest in the theoretical literature. While papers like Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) and Kohler (2003) stress the importance of international diﬀerences in relative prices
as driving force of outsourcing, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Harris (2001), for example,
focus on the role of exogenous reductions in general services and telecommunications costs
for allowing outsourcing to occur. The consequences of outsourcing for local labour markets
are not clear cut in theory, depending on the models and assumptions chosen, outsourcing
of the low skill intensive part of production can lead to decreases or increases in the wage
of (unskilled) labour in the fragmenting economy (see, for example: Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), Arndt (1997), Arndt (1999), Venables (1999); Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Kohler
(2004)). Whether workers in practice gain or lose from fragmentation is, therefore, largely
an empirical question.
One of the ﬁrst systematic empirical studies on the labour market impact of interna-
tional outsourcing is Feenstra and Hanson (1996). In their study for the United States they
estimate a factor share equation for an industry panel of more than 400 industries. In the
model international outsourcing, approximated by the industries’ import penetration ratios,
is implemented as a shift parameter similar to technological progress. Following this proce-
dure, the authors report that approximately 15% to 33% of the increase of the cost share
of non-production labour over the period 1979-1987 can be explained by international out-
sourcing. In a follow-up study Feenstra and Hanson (1999) apply a narrower deﬁnition of
international outsourcing by focusing on imported intermediate inputs of an industry from
the same industry abroad. According to this study international outsourcing can explain
between 11% and 15% of the observed decline in the cost share of production labour in U.S.
manufacturing between 1979 and 1990. Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001) extend the above
studies by simultaneously incorporating several trade and technology related measures that
can shift relative labour demand in a system of factor demand equations. Their results sug-
gest that international outsourcing as well as trade and technological change signiﬁcantly
4lowered relative demand for low-skilled labour.
The above studies have in common that international outsourcing is assumed to be ex-
ogenous to the industry, hence international outsourcing is no ”choice factor” (Morrison-Paul
and Siegel (2001) p. 245). This assumption could in principle be criticised since, at least to
some degree, international fragmentation is an industry’s choice variable, and relative labour
demand and the extent of fragmentation are then determined simultaneously.
Falk and Koebel (2002) propose an approach that in principle overcomes endogeneity
bias in industry level studies. Using a Box-Cox cost function, which nests the normalised
quadratic as well as the translog functional form, they estimate elasticities of substitution
from a system of input-output equations. Outsourcing is implemented in the model as a ﬂexi-
ble choice variable captured by relative prices for imported intermediate goods and purchased
services. Their ﬁndings suggest that between 1978 and 1990 neither imported material inputs
nor purchased services substitute for unskilled labour in German manufacturing industries.8
This approach can be criticised from a theoretical point of view since the impact of
international outsourcing is only captured by relative price changes for intermediate inputs
that are actually traded. However, intensiﬁed international outsourcing is consistent with
unchanging or even increasing relative prices for imported intermediate inputs as they are
revealed by trade statistics. The driving forces behind international outsourcing are not
necessarily the dynamics of relative prices but exogenous factors such as trade liberalisation,
the opening up of former communist states or new advances in communication technologies
that enable ﬁrms or industries to economise on absolute cost diﬀerentials between domestic
and foreign production at any ﬁxed point in time (see Wood (2002), Jones and Kierzkowski
(2001), Harris (2001)).9
Our approach diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the previous empirical studies and may be con-
sidered suitable to overcome the shortcomings discussed above. Utilising a large household
panel, we incorporate the industry’s international outsourcing activity as a shift parameter
in a Mincerian (Mincer (1974)) wage model. This approach has substantial advantages over
an industry level analysis, as it allows controlling for individual observed and unobserved
heterogeneity thereby avoiding aggregation bias. In addition, changes in relative earnings can
now be decomposed into wage gains and losses for diﬀerent skill groups. Furthermore, since
8Another solution to this problem could be to instrument for international outsourcing. However, it is diﬃcult
to ﬁnd valid instruments. See Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001) and Hsieh and Woo (2003) for applications.
9The problem is that the reduction in obstacles to outsourcing such as trade barriers or high communication
costs is not necessarily reﬂected in declining prices for traded intermediates, as there might have been initially no
or much less trade with intermediates.
5the industry’s outsourcing activities may be largely considered exogenous to the individual,
endogeneity bias due to simultaneous determination of labour demand and international
outsourcing at the industry level may arguably be to some extent reduced.
Given the nature of our econometric estimation our results should be interpreted as
the short run eﬀects of international outsourcing on wages of individuals within industries.
Hence, we can think of our approach as essentially partial equilibrium, in line with the
theoretical one sector setting of, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1996). This is consistent with
a short run view of the economy such that labour is immobile between industries. Many
previous empirical studies implicitly or explicitly make the same assumption (Feenstra and
Hanson (1996), Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001), Hsieh and Woo (2003)).
In line with Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999) we construct













with j denoting the respective two-digit manufacturing industry (j ² J), IMP the value
of imported intermediate inputs from a foreign industry and Y the industry’s output value.
Hence, narrowly deﬁned outsourcing only captures an industry’s imported intermediate in-
puts from the same industry abroad while widely deﬁned outsourcing incorporates all im-
ported intermediate manufacturing goods of an industry.
III Recent labour market trends and international outsourcing
It is well established that relative earnings of low skilled workers have decreased in most
OECD countries during the last two decades. However, wage trends are far from uniform
across countries with the US and Great Britain experiencing very strong increases in the
wage dispersion, and countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan and Spain only experiencing
modest decreases in the relative earnings of low skilled workers (see Freeman and Katz (1995),
OECD (1994) for a detailed discussion).
In this study we focus on the German labour market which is an interesting case since
it is not only the largest economy in Europe, but it is also far more open to international
trade than for instance the U.S. and has a fairly rigid labour market. Furthermore political
and economic transition in the former communist Central and Eastern European countries
6(CEEC’s) during the 1990’s now allows for intensive production sharing with these economies
at Germany’s doorstep with potentially large implications for the German labour market.
Nonetheless, considering the wage distribution in Germany, abundant empirical evidence
suggests that relative wages of the low skilled have virtually not changed or have even
increased since the 1980’s (see Abraham and Houseman (1995), Fitzenberger (1999), Prasad
(2000), Beaudry and Green (2000)).10
Against this background international outsourcing in German manufacturing has grown
substantially. Figure 1 shows the development of international outsourcing during the 1990’s
for the manufacturing industry as a whole. As can be seen, narrowly deﬁned international
outsourcing (as in equation 1) increased by around 60 percent between 1991 and 2000 while
widely deﬁned outsourcing grew somewhat slower by 45 percent over the same period. Figure
2 shows the evolvement of international outsourcing by two digit NACE industries. Even
though international outsourcing is of very diﬀerent importance for the separate industries
and the dynamic patterns vary considerably almost every industry shows signiﬁcant growth
in the outsourcing activity.
Thus, constant relative earnings for low-skilled workers coincide with pronounced in-
creases in international outsourcing which at ﬁrst sight casts doubt on a connection between
relative earnings and outsourcing. However, relative earnings can be determined by a whole
range of demand and supply factors that might cancel each other out. A thorough anal-
ysis of the impact of international outsourcing on the wage distribution therefore requires
simultaneous controlling for other important determinants of the wage structure.
IV The Empirical Model
In order to analyse more rigorously the impact of international outsourcing on wages we
estimate variants of the following log wage equation:
ln WAGEijt = ® + ¯ DEMOGit + ° WORKit + ± EDUCit (3)
+ µ INDjt + ¸ OUTjt + ¿j + ¹t + ¶i + ²it
where WAGEijt denotes individual i’s monthly wages in industry j, which are deﬁned in
the next section below.
10Our own analysis on the basis of the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1991-2000 also fails to
identify signiﬁcant changes in the earnings distribution between diﬀerent skill groups, which is in line with the
literature.
7We apply control variables that are standard in such wage regressions, see for example
Mincer (1974), Brown and Medoﬀ (1989), Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991). DEMOG
denotes the demographic control variables for age, marital status, geographic region. The
second set of control variables (WORK) contains characteristics related to the workplace
such as size and ownership of the ﬁrm, tenure, occupational category. A third set of control
variables (EDUC) contains educational dummies for high education (edhigh) and medium
(edmed) education, low education (edlow) is the omitted category. We also control for time
changing industry characteristics (IND) by including industry output and two types of
capital (plant and equipment). Furthermore, we incorporate two measures to control for the
eﬀects of technological change: First, we include the industry’s research and development
intensity, as in, e.g., Machin and Reenen (1998). Also, to allow for further technological
change eﬀects at industry level not captured in the research and development variable we
include an industry speciﬁc time trend.
We subsequently incorporate a narrow and a wide deﬁnition of international outsourcing
(OUT) as in equation 1 and 2. The error term is decomposed into general industry speciﬁc
eﬀects (¿j) and general time speciﬁc eﬀects (¹t) which we estimate with a full set of industry
dummies and time dummies respectively. This also enables us to control extensively for time
invariant industry level wage determinants other than those captured by our outsourcing
variable (OUT) and the additional time varying industry variables. Furthermore the general
time dummies also capture manufacturing wide eﬀects such as technological progress and
business cycles. We also allow for individual ﬁxed eﬀects (¶i) that take account of unchanging
observable and unobservable individual characteristics.11 The remaining error term (²it) is
assumed to be normally distributed.
Combining individual and industry level data could give rise to contemporaneous correla-
tion that results in distorted standard errors as discussed in Moulton (1990). As has become
standard in the literature we therefore adjust the standard errors to allow for an unspeciﬁed
correlation of error terms across individuals within the same industry. One further potential
problem casting doubt on the validity of our results could arise from sample selection as
low-skilled workers are more likely to lose their jobs.12 However sample selection bias only
occurs if selection is correlated with the idiosyncratic error term. This is unlikely in our
case, since we control for a wide range of observable as well as unobservable characteris-
tics. Nevertheless we test for that hypothesis implementing the simple procedure suggested
11Random eﬀects were rejected in a Hausman speciﬁcation test.
12A fact that is fairly well established in the literature (see Reinberg and Hummel (2002)) and that we can also
conﬁrm with our data.
8by Wooldridge (2002) in Chapter 17.7.1. This test allows us to reject correlation between
selection and the idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (3) constrains all coeﬃcients to the be same across skill groups. In order to relax
these restrictions we also estimate the equation for each and every skill group separately.
V Data
The analysis is based on data from Sample A and E 13 from the German Socio Economic
Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1991 to 2000 (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) for a
detailed description of the panel).
Our sample is restricted to prime age (18 to 65 years) male blue and white collar workers
in full time employment over the whole period in the manufacturing industry (NACE 15-
36). In order to maximize the number of observations, we choose an unbalanced design of
the sample. The sample therefore covers 1613 individuals yielding a total number of 5268
observations. In order to avoid selection bias with respect to item non-response that might
be not completely at random each explanatory variable was supplemented with a dummy
for missing values. Subsequently missing values where recoded to zero and the generated
dummies for missing values also act as regressors in the model.14
Wages are deﬁned as average hourly gross labour earnings over the year preceding the re-
spective interview month. Gross yearly wages and yearly working hours are derived from the
CNEF equivalent ﬁles. Observations with missing wage information were excluded from the
sample, hence we disregard observations with imputed wage information in the subsequent
analysis.15
We apply three diﬀerent skill deﬁnitions that only partly overlap. A description of the
alternative skill groupings can be found in Table 1. Firstly, we diﬀerentiate between three
diﬀerent skill groups based on information on educational attainment and vocational train-
ing. Secondly, we utilise internationally comparable information following the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED)16 to derive a somewhat diﬀerent skill diﬀeren-
tiation. Thirdly, we apply an alternative skill grouping based on the respondents information
on the qualiﬁcation that their current job actually requires. Applying this alternative skill
13Respondents from the foreigner, the immigrant and the East-German sample are therefore excluded.
14In general these coeﬃcients are only reported if statistically signiﬁcant.
15Frick and Grabka (2003) describe the imputation procedure for missing wage information. Since the procedure
does not use industry level information, heterogeneity in the wage distribution with respect to industry level
variables, particularly outsourcing, is reduced preventing the use of imputed data for our analysis.
16see UNESCO (1997).
9grouping is an interesting extension since it takes account of the actually demanded qualiﬁ-
cation by employers as opposed to the supplied qualiﬁcation by employees.
Table 2 shows the skill structure, based on educational attainment, within each manu-
facturing industry and the employment share of the respective industry.
Industry level data on international outsourcing were obtained from input-output tables
by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce. Intermediate inputs corresponding to narrowly
deﬁned international outsourcing are represented by the main diagonal of the input-output
matrix for imports. Intermediate inputs corresponding to the wide deﬁnition are represented
by the column sum of imported intermediate inputs from manufacturing industries. Data on
industry output and plant and equipment were obtained from the German Federal Statistical
Oﬃce. Research and development investment data were obtained from the OECD ANBERD
data base which provides data at the two digit (ISIC rev. 3) level for the years 1995 onwards.
Research and development investment at the two digit level for earlier years was imputed
with a linear trend.
VI Results
The results of estimating equations (3) and (4) using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator to allow for
time invariant individual speciﬁc eﬀects and applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition17 are reported
in Table 3. The regressions also include a full set of regional dummies18 and time dummies
as well as a full set of time ﬁxed industry dummies and industry speciﬁc linear trends. Note
that the coeﬃcients on the individual and ﬁrm level variables are largely as expected: Age
and tenure are positively related with wages (in a non-linear fashion for the former variable)
and wages also increase for married workers and with the educational attainment. We also
ﬁnd that workers in small ﬁrms on average receive lower wages than in large (size > 2000
employees is default category) ﬁrms, reﬂecting the common ﬁnding of a ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect
(Brown and Medoﬀ (1989)).
The variable of most interest to us is, of course, the measure of international outsourcing.
Column (a) reports results for the narrow measure of outsourcing as deﬁned in equation
(1), while column (c) is for the wide measure as in equation (2). As can be seen, in these
regressions we ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant negative eﬀects of international outsourcing on
wages. After allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients across skill groups, the outsourcing coeﬃcients
17see Table 1
18The regional dummies are deﬁned for each of the old West German federal states (L¨ ander) plus one dummy
capturing all new East German states.
10remain negative for all skill groups and are statistically insigniﬁcant with the exception of
the wide measure of outsourcing for low skilled workers (3, columns b and d).
We now relax the assumption of equal coeﬃcients across diﬀerent skill groups by esti-
mating the model separately for each and every skill group19. Hence, we allow for diﬀerences
in the wage determination for diﬀerent skill groups. Again we incorporate a full set of re-
gional dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry speciﬁc time trends. Table
4 depicts the estimation results with narrowly and widely deﬁned outsourcing for each skill
group. Notably, the coeﬃcients on the individual and ﬁrm level variables diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between the estimations for the diﬀerent skill groups. Constraining the coeﬃcients to be
uniform across skill groups therefore indeed seems not appropriate.20
With regard to the impact of outsourcing the coeﬃcients also diﬀer substantially from
the previous speciﬁcation (compare Table 3 and Table 4). For high-skilled workers the
coeﬃcient of narrowly deﬁned outsourcing is now found to be statistically signiﬁcant and
positive with a one percentage point increase in the outsourcing intensity ceteris paribus
yielding a positive wage premium of about 2.5 percent. A similar eﬀect is found for widely
deﬁned outsourcing (see Table 4 columns a and d). Hence, international outsourcing appears
to raise the wage for high skilled workers, a ﬁnding that is in line with the idea that ﬁrms
outsource the low skill intensive parts of production and, hence, increase the relative demand
for skilled workers. For medium- and low-skilled workers we ﬁnd negative coeﬃcients on the
outsourcing intensity, which is also in line with this reasoning. However, these coeﬃcients
are not statistically signiﬁcant.21
In order to check how robust this result is to alternative skill deﬁnitions, we apply the
two alternative skill measures based on ISCED classiﬁcations and required qualiﬁcations for
the respondents current job (see section V and Table 1) and estimate the impact of narrow
and wide outsourcing for each skill group.
Applying the skill grouping in line with the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Ed-
ucation (ISCED) we again ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients on outsourcing for high skilled workers,
suggesting magnitudes similar to those found in the previous speciﬁcation. In this speciﬁca-
19applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition as in Table 1
20This is also conﬁrmed more formally by an F-test that rejects the parameter constraints.
21As a means of comparison we have also estimated our model including industries’ import penetration cal-
culated as imports from OECD countries and imports from non-OECD countries over gross production. As
Anderton and Brenton (1999) state, particular import penetration from non-OECD countries can arguably be
considered as measuring the outsourcing of low-skill intensive production to low-wage locations. However, in our
regressions the coeﬃcients of import penetration are always estimated to be statistically insigniﬁcant indicating
the irrelevance of import penetration for wages.
11tion we now also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant and negative impacts of outsourcing on wages
of low-skilled workers, suggesting reductions in wages by about 1.2 percent following a one
percentage point increase in the industry’s outsourcing intensity. We still fail to ﬁnd any
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on medium-skilled workers, however (see Table 5).
The results for the skill deﬁnition based on required education further support these
ﬁndings. International outsourcing, both for the narrow and wide deﬁnition has a statistically
signiﬁcant positive impact on workers who report that their job requires a college or technical
school training. For example, a one percentage point increase in the narrow outsourcing
intensity ceteris paribus raising wages by about 2.4 percent. For workers with lower required
qualiﬁcations we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of outsourcing with a one
percentage point increase in narrow outsourcing yielding a wage loss of around 1.5 percent,
all other things equal (see Table 6).
In order to get a better idea of the economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients we perform
simulations based on the statistically signiﬁcant results in Table 3 to 6. For the simulations
we ﬁrstly use the estimation results in the tables to predict the expected wage for our sample.
We then use the same regression results and data to obtain a prediction in which we constrain
the outsourcing variable to the value of 1991. Hence, this prediction can be interpreted
as showing the hypothetical average wage for the sample with constant outsourcing. The
diﬀerence between these two predictions can be interpreted as the wage eﬀect of international
outsourcing.
The comparisons of the standard prediction and the prediction without outsourcing are
plotted in Figures 3 to 13 for the two measures of outsourcing and the various skill deﬁ-
nitions.22 In Figure 6, for example, the plots illustrate that in our sample of prime age,
full time working men hourly wages for the average high-skilled manufacturing worker would
have been approximately 3 DM less in 2000 if there had been no increase in narrow outsourc-
ing activity since 1991. For low skilled workers, the wage loss following narrow outsourcing
was about 0.2 DM in the same year (see Figure 7). Wide outsourcing has an eﬀect of similar
magnitude for high skilled workers (Figure 8), however, the eﬀect of wide outsourcing for
low skilled workers is higher than for narrow outsourcing at about 0.5 DM per hour. The
predicted eﬀects are in the same direction in all diagrams, it is notable, however, that the
magnitude of the wage change related to outsourcing depends on the actual variable used to
calculate the level of outsourcing.
Another interesting pattern in the diagrams is that the predicted lines cross, suggesting,
22We only show predictions of the point estimates if statistically signiﬁcant. Of course, we could also construct
conﬁdence intervals for the predictions but for the sake of clarity of the diagrams we refrain from plotting these.
12for example in Figure 6, that wages for high skilled workers would have been higher without
outsourcing in the early 1990s. This pattern is reversed in the late 1990s, however, with
increased outsourcing activity raising wages compared to an alternative scenario where no
outsourcing had taken place.
VII Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on the implications of outsourcing for labour markets
by investigating the eﬀect of international outsourcing, measured in terms of imports of
intermediates, on wages for diﬀerent skill groups. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst paper to use individual level data to look at this issue. Our results show that outsourcing
has a marked impact on wages. We ﬁnd evidence of a negative eﬀect of outsourcing on the
real wage for low-skilled workers. We also ﬁnd evidence that high-skilled workers gain from
outsourcing in terms of receiving higher wages. These results are robust to a number of
diﬀerent speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions of outsourcing.
This suggests that low-skilled workers are the losers from this form of globalisation of
production, while high-skilled workers are, on average, the group that may be able to gain.
This has implications for policy makers, who need to debate whether losers should be com-
pensated or in any other way be the focus of policies aimed at easing the adjustment cost of
globalisation.
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Table 1: Alternative skill classiﬁcations
1) Educational Attainment
low skill no degree
no degree + occupational training
lower school degree
lower school degree + additional occupational training
intermediary school
medium skill lower school degree + technical school
intermediary school + additional occupational training
degree for professional college
high school degree
high skill high school + additional occupational training
degree of professional college + additional occupational training
higher technical college
University degree
2) International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED)
low skill Lower secondary education, Second stage of basic education
medium skill Upper secondary education, Post-secondary non tertiary education,
ﬁrst stage of tertiary education
high skill Second stage of tertiary education
3) Required Qualiﬁcation
low skill work requires less than technical college or university degree
high skill work requires technical college or university degree
24Table 2: Employment shares and skill* structure of industries in %
Employment Share High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled
of industry within industry
Food products, beverages, tobaco 6.24 14.46 29.46 56.08
Textiles 1.80 10.97 38.08 50.95
Wearing apparel 0.32 10.00 18.33 71.67
Tanning,dressing of leather 0.46 0.00 25.83 74.17
Wood products, except furniture 1.84 12.30 19.98 67.72
Pulp, paper and paper products 1.66 7.62 25.37 67.01
Publishing, printing and reproduction 2.97 29.21 39.10 31.69
Coke, reﬁned petroleum 0.56 21.67 37.04 41.30
Chemicals and chemical products 13.05 25.44 29.10 45.47
Rubber and plastic products 2.93 10.75 35.58 53.67
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.23 2.26 42.44 55.30
Basic metals 3.44 12.22 23.96 63.82
Fabricated metal products 20.79 13.00 30.59 56.41
Machinery and equipment 11.77 25.33 39.00 35.67
Oﬃce machinery and computer 0.29 37.50 8.33 54.17
Electrical machinery and apparatus 8.18 39.90 31.28 28.82
Radio, television and communication 1.75 41.54 35.00 23.46
Medical, precision and optical instruments 2.97 26.51 52.47 21.03
Motor vehicles, trailers 12.61 23.58 28.13 48.29
Other transport equipment 1.58 25.10 41.44 33.46
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1.74 6.03 38.55 55.42
*applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition from Table 1
25Table 3: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Fragmentation
Narrow Fragmentation Wide Fragmentation
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Age: 18-24 0.0498 0.0503 0.0504 0.0502
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Age: 25-34 0.0958 0.0967 0.0967 0.0980
(1.15) (1.16) (1.16) (1.17)
Age: 35-44 0.1650 0.1658 0.1655 0.1664
(2.51)** (2.52)** (2.51)** (2.51)**
Age: 45-54 0.1710 0.1721 0.1709 0.1724
(3.76)*** (3.82)*** (3.77)*** (3.81)***
Married 0.0304 0.0302 0.0305 0.0300
(1.04) (1.02) (1.04) (1.01)
Number of Children -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0049
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.56)
Firm size: < 20 -0.1269 -0.1267 -0.1259 -0.1260
(1.53) (1.53) (1.52) (1.53)
Firm size: < 200 -0.0728 -0.0721 -0.0725 -0.0716
(1.28) (1.28) (1.27) (1.27)
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0159 -0.0155 -0.0156 -0.0153
(0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Firm:Public Owner 0.0687 0.0686 0.0687 0.0694
(1.29) (1.30) (1.29) (1.32)
Tenure -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09)
Educ: high 0.0339 0.0123 0.0322 -0.0545
(0.59) (0.16) (0.57) (0.49)
Educ: middle -0.0387 -0.0587 -0.0391 -0.0824
(0.86) (1.20) (0.87) (1.05)
Occ: nonresponse 0.0315 0.0309 0.0317 0.0313
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Occ: Managers/Legisl. 0.0723 0.0730 0.0714 0.0726
(0.97) (0.99) (0.97) (0.98)
Occ: Scientists 0.0605 0.0604 0.0600 0.0602
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
Occ: Technicians 0.0515 0.0510 0.0506 0.0506
(0.70) (0.70) (0.69) (0.70)
Occ: Clerks 0.0831 0.0843 0.0829 0.0848
(1.01) (1.04) (1.01) (1.04)
Occ: Service 0.0666 0.0680 0.0655 0.0654
(0.55) (0.56) (0.54) (0.54)
Occ: Craft 0.0269 0.0265 0.0268 0.0265
(0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
Occ: Operators/Assembl. 0.0624 0.0616 0.0625 0.0616
(1.16) (1.15) (1.17) (1.15)
Industry: R&D=Y 1.1373 1.1669 1.1055 1.1457
(0.71) (0.73) (0.70) (0.71)
Industry: equipment=Y 0.5247 0.5577 0.5357 0.5728
(1.16) (1.25) (1.17) (1.28)
Industry: plant=Y -1.2403 -1.3135 -1.1724 -1.2686
(1.43) (1.56) (1.35) (1.49)
Industry: Output (Y) -1.4100 -1.4300 -1.4300 -1.4500
(1.48) (1.52) (1.60) (1.66)*
Frag -0.0076 -0.0093
(1.15) (1.35)
Frag ¤ Educ : high -0.0062 -0.0057
(0.78) (0.67)
Frag ¤ Educ : middle -0.0061 -0.0082
(0.86) (1.11)
Frag ¤ Educ : low -0.0093 -0.0116
(1.41) (1.70)*
Constant 17.1820 17.4590 14.9530 15.6140
(1.48) (1.52) (1.31) (1.38)
Observations 5268 5268 5268 5268
R2 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry speciﬁc time trends; default
categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; Low Education; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
26Table 4: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Outsourcing by Educational Attainment
Narrow Outsourcing Wide Outsourcing
High Medium Low High Medium Low
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Age: 18-24 0.1247 0.0405 -0.0467 0.1267 0.0389 -0.0447
(1.11) (0.19) (0.40) (1.13) (0.18) (0.38)
Age: 25-34 0.0830 0.1456 0.0087 0.0842 0.1486 0.0106
(0.87) (0.82) (0.08) (0.88) (0.83) (0.09)
Age: 35-44 0.1094 0.2408 0.0748 0.1103 0.2422 0.0762
(1.12) (1.52) (0.94) (1.13) (1.53) (0.95)
Age: 45-54 0.1041 0.2106 0.1359 0.1050 0.2104 0.1366
(1.54) (1.70)* (2.87)*** (1.55) (1.70)* (2.87)***
Married -0.0111 0.1137 0.0116 -0.0114 0.1144 0.0118
(0.44) (1.93)* (0.24) (0.46) (1.95)* (0.24)
Number of Children 0.0324 -0.0210 -0.0323 0.0325 -0.0210 -0.0327
(1.38) (0.86) (2.64)*** (1.37) (0.86) (2.68)***
Firm size: < 20 -0.5397 -0.0624 -0.1332 -0.5450 -0.0602 -0.1319
(2.90)*** (0.57) (1.01) (2.92)*** (0.56) (1.00)
Firm size: < 200 -0.1094 -0.0817 -0.0689 -0.1108 -0.0811 -0.0684
(1.70)* (0.62) (0.90) (1.72)* (0.62) (0.89)
Firm size: < 2000 0.0130 0.0103 -0.0254 0.0116 0.0105 -0.0247
(0.68) (0.16) (0.58) (0.60) (0.16) (0.56)
Firm:Public Owner -0.0606 0.1347 0.0981 -0.0605 0.1319 0.0971
(0.77) (0.90) (1.46) (0.77) (0.88) (1.44)
Tenure -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0008
(0.28) (0.08) (0.19) (0.31) (0.09) (0.18)
Occ: nonresponse -0.1537 -0.0929 0.1435 -0.1564 -0.0966 0.1454
(1.24) (0.74) (1.02) (1.30) (0.78) (1.03)
Occ: Managers/Legisl. 0.0244 -0.1162 0.2103 0.0245 -0.1192 0.2099
(0.23) (0.83) (1.87)* (0.23) (0.86) (1.87)*
Occ: Scientists -0.0106 -0.0867 0.1717 -0.0109 -0.0900 0.1715
(0.09) (0.60) (0.92) (0.09) (0.63) (0.92)
Occ: Technicians -0.0424 -0.0379 0.1725 -0.0434 -0.0422 0.1715
(0.34) (0.34) (1.67)* (0.35) (0.38) (1.66)*
Occ: Clerks 0.0158 0.0590 0.0767 0.0151 0.0555 0.0773
(0.24) (0.49) (0.69) (0.23) (0.47) (0.69)
Occ: Service - -0.3220 0.1317 - -0.3238 0.1305
- (1.51) (0.69) - (1.53) (0.69)
Occ :Craft -0.0071 -0.0266 0.0801 -0.0087 -0.0300 0.0807
(0.07) (0.19) (0.99) (0.09) (0.21) (1.00)
Occ: Operators/Assembl. -0.0464 0.0353 0.1233 -0.0467 0.0343 0.1237
(0.82) (0.26) (2.06)** (0.84) (0.25) (2.06)**
Industry: R&D=Y 3.2138 0.8467 5.3232 2.9433 0.8417 5.2757
(1.65)* (0.10) (1.35) (1.53) (0.10) (1.39)
Industry: equipment=Y 1.1541 -0.3932 1.2578 1.2555 -0.3479 1.2654
(1.40) (0.40) (1.49) (1.46) (0.36) (1.47)
Industry: plant=Y -1.5888 -0.1027 -3.1411 -2.0877 -0.0321 -3.0748
(1.58) (0.08) (1.99)** (1.91)* (0.03) (1.93)*
Industry: Output (Y) 3.2500 -5.1300 0.2400 2.8100 -5.1000 0.1550
(1.46) (1.40) (0.13) (1.31) (1.46) (0.09)
OUT 0.0248 -0.0174 -0.0085 0.0230 -0.0200 -0.0111
(2.10)** (1.22) (0.79) (1.87)* (1.77)* (1.19)
Constant -27.4990 39.4630 31.3670 -23.3870 35.7160 27.9980
(1.37) (1.52) (1.49) (1.11) (1.34) (1.29)
Observations 1123 1719 2426 1123 1719 2426
R2 0.87 0.79 0.68 0.87 0.79 0.68
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry speciﬁc time trends; default
categories: Firm size:> 2000, Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
27Table 5: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Outsourcing by ISCED Skill Groups
Narrow Outsourcing Wide Outsourcing
High Medium Low High Medium Low
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Age: 18-24 0.2671 0.3546 -0.0116 0.2750 0.3556 -0.0108
(1.77)* (1.64) (0.09) (1.81)* (1.63) (0.09)
Age: 25-34 0.2117 0.1304 0.0550 0.2140 0.1321 0.0562
(1.84)* (0.80) (0.47) (1.86)* (0.80) (0.48)
Age: 35-44 0.2113 0.2543 0.1133 0.2136 0.2556 0.1140
(2.00)** (1.58) (1.46) (2.02)** (1.58) (1.47)
Age: 45-54 0.1459 0.2453 0.1481 0.1484 0.2461 0.1482
(1.96)* (1.78)* (3.40)*** (1.97)** (1.77)* (3.42)***
Married -0.0087 0.1382 0.0136 -0.0101 0.1383 0.0139
(0.26) (1.92)* (0.33) (0.32) (1.92)* (0.34)
Number of Children 0.0374 -0.0462 -0.0146 0.0373 -0.0460 -0.0148
(1.36) (1.15) (1.53) (1.34) (1.14) (1.55)
Firm size: < 20 -0.5178 -0.0351 -0.0995 -0.5207 -0.0347 -0.0981
(2.74)*** (0.28) (0.85) (2.76)*** (0.28) (0.84)
Firm size: < 200 -0.0882 -0.0409 -0.0624 -0.0890 -0.0418 -0.0619
(1.53) (0.59) (0.81) (1.54) (0.61) (0.80)
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0073 -0.0345 0.0112 -0.0075 -0.0348 0.0117
(0.24) (0.45) (0.24) (0.24) (0.46) (0.25)
Firm:Public Owner 0.0405 0.0553 0.0924 0.0435 0.0577 0.0915
(0.32) (0.34) (1.34) (0.34) (0.35) (1.33)
Tenure 0.0001 -0.0023 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0023 0.0003
(0.05) (0.61) (0.09) (0.06) (0.60) (0.09)
Occ: nonresponse -0.0505 -0.0682 0.0852 0.0000 -0.0684 0.0853
(0.60) (0.84) (0.77) (.) (0.83) (0.77)
Occ: Managers/Legisl. 0.0028 0.0652 0.1154 0.0531 0.0656 0.1139
(0.04) (0.61) (1.15) (0.64) (0.62) (1.14)
Occ: Scientists 0.0172 -0.0008 0.1097 0.0699 -0.0012 0.1091
(0.25) (0.01) (0.80) (1.81)* (0.01) (0.79)
Occ: Technicians 0.0580 -0.0495 0.1207 0.1105 -0.0505 0.1197
(0.53) (0.45) (1.36) (3.50)*** (0.46) (1.35)
Occ: Clerks 0.1167 0.1124 0.0738 0.1674 0.1110 0.0734
(1.75)* (0.83) (0.92) (1.23) (0.82) (0.92)
Occ: Service 0.0000 0.0000 0.0731 0.0000 0.0000 0.0711
(.) (.) (0.50) (.) (.) (0.49)
Occ :Craft 0.0000 -0.0567 0.0777 0.0490 -0.0561 0.0775
(.) (0.45) (1.20) (0.60) (0.45) (1.20)
Occ: Operators/Assembl. -0.0718 0.0405 0.1029 -0.0694 0.0413 0.1028
(1.16) (0.28) (1.88)* (1.12) (0.28) (1.88)*
Industry: R&D=Y 1.8011 7.8445 1.8605 1.1796 7.5382 1.9359
(0.70) (1.07) (0.76) (0.46) (1.05) (0.81)
Industry: equipment=Y 0.4998 0.9013 0.6951 0.7108 0.9529 0.6928
(0.33) (0.49) (1.00) (0.46) (0.51) (0.97)
Industry: plant=Y 1.0594 -2.9889 -2.0342 0.3295 -3.0821 -1.9453
(0.50) (1.06) (2.43)** (0.15) (1.12) (2.25)**
Industry: Output (Y) 4.4900 -7.0500 -0.6410 3.6500 -7.3100 -0.5980
(1.84)* (2.09)** (0.57) (1.70)* (2.21)** (0.54)
OUT 0.0336 0.0044 -0.0118 0.0275 0.0002 -0.0127
(2.33)** (0.22) (1.72)* (2.66)*** (0.01) (2.15)**
Constant -6.7355 -92.2060 30.6110 -3.3700 -93.4690 27.6310
(0.52) (1.35) (2.11)** (0.24) (1.41) (1.89)*
Observations 891 1004 3369 891 1004 3369
R2 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.87 0.71 0.72
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry speciﬁc time trends; default
categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012; For 4 observations of the initial sample ISCED
classiﬁcations are missing.
28Table 6: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression by Required Skill
Narrow Outsourcing Wide Outsourcing
High Low High Low
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Age: 18-24 - 0.0623 - 0.0644
- (0.60) - (0.62)
Age: 25-34 0.0417 0.1073 0.0448 0.1100
(0.43) (1.08) (0.47) (1.10)
Age: 35-44 0.0918 0.1736 0.0946 0.1752
(1.23) (2.29)** (1.27) (2.30)**
Age: 45-54 0.0811 0.1830 0.0825 0.1832
(1.47) (3.61)*** (1.48) (3.61)***
Married 0.0239 0.0188 0.0241 0.0189
(0.56) (0.53) (0.57) (0.53)
Number of Children 0.0336 -0.0242 0.0330 -0.0245
(1.37) (2.39)** (1.36) (2.39)**
Firm size: < 20 -0.5623 -0.1149 -0.5653 -0.1126
(2.71)*** (1.13) (2.73)*** (1.11)
Firm size: < 200 -0.0907 -0.0841 -0.0904 -0.0832
(1.42) (1.24) (1.42) (1.22)
Firm size: < 2000 0.0127 -0.0206 0.0131 -0.0197
(0.51) (0.44) (0.52) (0.42)
Firm:Public Owner 0.0656 0.0653 0.0663 0.0644
(0.50) (0.90) (0.50) (0.89)
Tenure -0.0031 0.0011 -0.0033 0.0012
(0.79) (0.41) (0.81) (0.43)
Occ: nonresponse - 0.0261 - 0.0265
- (0.29) - (0.30)
Occ: Managers/Legisl. 0.2695 0.0549 0.2748 0.0534
(5.12)*** (0.78) (5.11)*** (0.77)
Occ: Scientists 0.3099 0.0848 0.3147 0.0844
(10.06)*** (0.72) (9.77)*** (0.72)
Occ: Technicians 0.3583 0.0244 0.3614 0.0227
(6.44)*** (0.30) (6.35)*** (0.28)
Occ: Clerks 0.2743 0.0882 0.2773 0.0878
(5.14)*** (1.01) (5.06)*** (1.01)
Occ: Service - 0.0435 - 0.0414
- (0.40) - (0.38)
Occ :Craft 0.2558 0.0152 0.2601 0.0150
(6.34)*** (0.27) (6.09)*** (0.27)
Occ: Operators/Assembl. 0.0000 0.0529 0.0000 0.0531
(.) (1.02) (.) (1.02)
Industry: R&D=Y 2.3766 2.9769 2.1834 2.9897
(1.17) (0.70) (1.10) (0.70)
Industry: equipment=Y 1.9508 0.3860 2.0508 0.4090
(1.88)* (0.67) (1.87)* (0.71)
Industry: plant=Y -4.4802 -2.2134 -5.0401 -2.1452
(2.13)** (1.35) (2.17)** (1.31)
Industry: Output (Y) 2.7900 -1.8700 2.4200 -1.8800
(1.41) (1.06) (1.27) (1.10)
OUT 0.0237 -0.0151 0.0222 -0.0176
(1.88)* (2.16)** (1.94)* (2.68)***
Constant -4.7906 18.2330 -2.0152 14.1410
(0.28) (1.36) (0.12) (1.06)
Observations 892 4332 892 4332
R2 0.83 0.73 0.83 0.73
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry speciﬁc time trends; default
categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012; For 44 observations of the initial sample
information on required qualiﬁcation is missing.
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